Standing Committee E

[Mr. Alan Hurst in the Chair]

Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Bill

Clause 100 - Local authority

Amendment proposed [this day]: No. 293, in page 50, line 12, leave out 'or 24A(1)' and insert 
', 24A(1) or 26(1)(c) or (d)'.—[Angela Eagle.]
 Question again proposed, That the amendment be made.

Angela Eagle: The hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes) asked for the full list of offences to which the clause will relate. The formal answer is those under section 24(1)(a), (b), (c), (e) or (f), section 24A(1) and section 26(1)(c) or (d) of the Immigration Act 1971. In plain English, that means that the clause covers those who overstay or breach conditions of entry, enter illegally, obtain leave to enter by deception, knowingly enter the UK in breach of a deportation order without leave, abscond, or try to evade enforcement action.
 Those are all immigration offences, and I hope that the hon. Gentleman will understand that the idea of clause 100, which is the first of several clauses concerning information, is to keep the issue in proportion. Before lunch, we said clearly that no fishing expeditions are implied in clauses 100 to 106. They deal with information gateways, and to trigger the gateways, the Secretary of State must have a reasonable suspicion that an individual has committed a specified immigration offence. It is important that we can pursue information to catch up with such people. 
 The other side of the coin of having an immigration system that works well is the need to ensure that our system cracks down on those who have entered the UK illegally and on their opportunities to disappear into the system and evade the authorities. By definition, and speaking generally about the clause, that means that we want to share information without imposing burdens or starting fishing expeditions. We will deal with people's privacy in a way that allows us to put together information and then find and put pressure on those who harbour illegal workers or profit from them, whether from bonded labour or otherwise. If we do that, we will create a fair system for people entering the country and minimise the chances of those who have entered by deception continuing to profit by not bringing themselves to the attention of the authorities. I hope that, with those assurances, the hon. Gentleman will accept the amendment. 
 Amendment agreed to.

Gregory Barker: I beg to move amendment No. 304, in page 50, line 15, after 'section', insert 'through a named officer'.
 Now that I am an old hand at this amendment-moving business, I want to speak to another probing amendment. 
 We need a prompt, efficient system that is far more effective than that which has operated in recent years at keeping track of and removing immigration offenders. The clause will allow the Secretary of State more easily to track down various applicants but it also constructs a system of surveillance and information exchange which would not look out of place in the old German Democratic Republic. We need to be mindful of three important factors so that the tracking system will not be open to abuse: it must be sensitive; it must be applied consistently and, perhaps most importantly, it must ensure absolute secrecy and confidentiality. 
 If the system is to encapsulate those three factors, it is vital that the information is provided to and through a named officer who is also suitably senior and qualified. Not only should the officer be specifically designated to reveal the information, but the method by which he or she gives out the information is extremely relevant and should be tightly controlled. Only last year, someone purporting to be the Leader of the Opposition managed, on the strength of a feeble impersonation, to get through the Downing street switchboard to the Prime Minister in his bedroom.

Angela Eagle: Only on the phone.

Gregory Barker: Yes—I did say through the switchboard.
 If the information is to be transferred by telephone, there need to be strict procedures governing its release. Is it proposed that such communications will take place by telephone? Would it not be better for information to be passed by letter, fax or even e-mail? Such a system could easily be compromised by organised criminals or fraudsters tracking down the exact whereabouts of unwitting individuals. I hope that the Minister can assure us that that necessary information will be dealt with in a tight and well-ordered way, and that records will be kept so that if there is a miscarriage of justice or the system is abused, individuals are clearly accountable and the necessary safeguards to which I have alluded are in place.

Simon Hughes: The Minister will know that the issue concerns the official Opposition and my party.
 First, what is the collective response of local authorities to the proposal? Have they responded to the consultation and, if so, can we see that response? Some authorities must have concerns and it would be helpful to know whether they have responded only collectively—through the Association of London Government, the Local Government Association or similar organisations in Scotland and Northern Ireland—or whether there have there specific representations. Has there been any response from my local authority of Southwark, for example, or from the authorities of other members of the Committee?
 Secondly, I agree that a named officer should deal with the information but I will be even more specific than the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle (Mr. Barker): it should be the chief executive's responsibility. This is a probing amendment, so it is proper to widen the debate. We are talking about people's liberties, their prospects of being arrested and taken away, and the exchange of information that might lead to that. Information should therefore be channelled through the chief executive. 
 One reason why that is an obvious suggestion is that it would be easier to determine accountability. Every local authority would have someone at the most senior level who knew the score and who could feed information to elected members of the local authority and to Members of Parliament. That individual would have the responsibility that would otherwise be given to an officer lodged in one department, when the issue was not one for a single department. It might be a housing issue, involving tenants. It might be an electoral registration issue, involving Commonwealth citizens who were here legally or illegally. If they were here legally, they might be entitled to go on the electoral register. It might be a social services issue. The chief executive, or someone holding an equivalent position, should therefore have that responsibility. 
 As I said, it would be helpful to know if an indicative or definitive list had been sent out which detailed the circumstances in which a local authority could request information. The Minister alluded to certain circumstances in the debate on the previous amendment.

Angela Eagle: On the point raised by the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle, the Data Protection Act 1998 already provides the necessary safeguard by ensuring that any such data must be processed securely. It cannot be sent around willy-nilly for anyone to look at. We believe that most local authority requests will be made in writing, and, presumably, they will be complied with thereafter in writing. Records of requests made by the immigration authorities will be carefully kept. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will see that his worries are unfounded.
 The Greater London Authority expressed concern about possible implications for social services and children, which the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey echoed today. The power is limited to non-sensitive information, and would not be relevant for child protection or social services issues. It relates to the whereabouts of people about whom the Secretary of State has reasonable suspicion, and who fall into the categories of immigration offences which I mentioned during the debate on the Government amendment. I hope that that reassures the hon. Gentleman. No other local authority associations have made comments to date, but I suspect that the Bill's timetable has prevented them from making much detailed scrutiny. We are open to any representations that local authorities need to make.
 The powers are similar to those in the Social Security Fraud Act 2001. They have operated well, and no onerous burdens have resulted from them. The hon. Gentleman needs to remember that we must have reasonable suspicion about an individual. We then seek their whereabouts by using information such as council tax or housing benefit details, which may be available from a local authority and may help us to apprehend sooner rather than later those people who have broken immigration rules. In most organisations, the data is regularly processed in legitimate circumstances at whatever level the authority decides. To place a burden on the chief executive is organisationally impractical and will make the daily use of the powers more difficult. 
 I ask the hon. Gentleman at least to acknowledge that the apprehension and deportation of immigration offenders is in the public interest, and that proportionate, tightly drawn powers, which do not allow fishing trips and whose use will be recorded by the immigration authorities, are an entirely legitimate response to some of the difficulties that we face with those who dodge immigration rules. With that reassurance, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will make it two in a row and withdraw his amendment.

Simon Hughes: This is a probing amendment, and I am reassured by some of the Minister's comments, but I still have a number of concerns. I am reassured that she reminded us of the test of reasonable suspicion and that the provision has only one purpose: to establish where a person is. I accept that both are perfectly valid limitations on the Secretary of State's power. It is also helpful to know that there has not yet been a response from local authorities. I hope that this debate will at least facilitate such a response, ideally through representative organisations, so that a view can be formed.

Angela Eagle: The reason for the provision is merely to provide absolute clarity about the existence of the power. Currently, some local authorities respond well to requests for information, but the response from others can be patchy. That is partly because they are worried about whether they have the power to disclose the information, but in fact they are required to do so. As I said, the provision is about making the existence of the power much clearer, so that authorities do not worry that they are breaking other rules by complying with the requirements.

Simon Hughes: I understand that, but I am not sure whether the Bill is as narrowly drawn as the Minister said in relation to social services. I cannot remember the term that she used about the information.

Angela Eagle: Non-sensitive.

Simon Hughes: Yes, the Minister said that only non-sensitive information was relevant. I do not doubt that that is the intention, but I ask her to reconsider whether that is what the Bill says, because it does not appear to. Someone might say, ''One way of tracking down this family would be to go through the social
 services records, because their children were taken into care.'' I do not question the hon. Lady's good faith, but I should be grateful if she would reconsider that issue later.
 Interestingly, this part of the Bill does not contain a provision for similar powers in relation to the police. I assume that that is because there is already a power in statute to request information from the police. The Minister may comment on that. Clause 102, which relates to the police, deals with a power in respect of good character, not whereabouts. 
 I still disagree on the point about the officer. I understand the argument that was advanced, but I do not accept it. The officer might nominally be the chief executive and have someone else do the work. This is an important matter, because we may create a nonsensical situation in which information goes to different sorts of officers who, because of their authority, would not normally have access to it. 
 I assume that the Minister accepts the point made by the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle and I through the amendment: that a single named officer is a good idea. I do not think that she expressly said so. I urge her again, between now and Report stage, and after consultation with local government organisations, to reflect on whether it should not be the chief executive. I have one other general point, but I imagine that it should most properly be raised in the clause stand part debate, so I will leave it for now.

Gregory Barker: I fully support the intention behind the clause and I am grateful to the Minister for saying that she wants only to bring clarity to an existing modus operandi. However, in the interests of clarity, the discipline of having a named officer or officers would enhance the existing system and bring discipline to the operations of local government officers, which the Minister is clearly having trouble co-ordinating.
 I hope that the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey is right in thinking that the Minister is in favour of a named or several named officers. Unlike the hon. Gentleman, I do not believe that the chief executive is necessarily the most appropriate officer: over-burdening already severely pressed senior officials is the last thing we should do. Nevertheless, it is right for a specifically named officer—or, depending on the work load, officers—to have clear responsibility. 
 I hope that we can pin down more precisely the way in which the information will be given and transferred. The Minister has said that it should generally be in writing, but I hope for further clarification. I am grateful for the Minister's assurances and beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

Neil Gerrard: I understand—the Minister will correct me if I am wrong—that nothing in the provisions changes the current responsibilities of local authorities under the Data Protection Act 1998. That Act makes a clear
 distinction between sensitive personal data—affecting child protection, for example—and other data. Clear rules prescribe how the data can be processed, what can be done with it, by whom and in what circumstances. I want to be absolutely clear that nothing in the clause alters the current responsibilities of the chief executive, or of any officer in a local authority who handles personal data.

Humfrey Malins: The clause requires information to be supplied if the Home Secretary ''reasonably suspects''. Will the Minister tell us who judges whether the suspicion is reasonable? Is it the person who makes the request, or the person to whom the request is addressed?

Simon Hughes: It seems unlikely, but occasionally the names of people who have not been granted permanent leave to remain or who have not yet had their claim determined have appeared on the electoral register. Electoral register policy applies to British, Irish and Commonwealth citizens for all elections and to European Union nationals for local and European elections. Is it sufficient to appear on the electoral register—that information is held by local authorities—if a person is in the country irrespective of status, or is it a prerequisite to have an established status? It may seem an esoteric point, but many new people come on to the register every year in constituencies such as mine. We all believe that entitlement to vote should be a consequence of a person's lawful position in this country, so the electoral register should accurately reflect that. However difficult it is to monitor, what the law says is important.
 This and subsequent clauses give considerable cause for concern, even with the data protection restrictions to which the hon. Member for Walthamstow (Mr. Gerrard) referred. My natural starting point is a concern that clause 100 and the subsequent clauses relating to the Inland Revenue, the police, medical inspectors, employers and financial institutions create additional powers for the Home Office to seek information on people from other agencies. 
 It is important that Parliament takes the view that obtaining and passing information between agencies and organisations should be the exception rather than the rule. It should be permitted only when there is justified good cause, and in such a way that the person to whom the information relates is able to track what it is, where it is and to whom it is passed, and is able to access it at any time, even if it is something he is not keen to know about. 
 If the local authority passes information to the Secretary of State under this provision, it is a basic prerequisite that the individual should be entitled to know what information was passed, as a safeguard to ensure the preservation of confidentiality. Only those qualified to give and receive information should do so to ensure that the information given and sought is only that which is necessary for the purpose. As the Minister rightly said, there should not be a fishing expedition.
 More and more powers are being given to Government by Home Office legislation—including the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and the data protection and freedom of information legislation—to obtain information, which may be used for good causes such as crime prevention and deterring terrorism. The supplying of such information needs to be carefully regulated and scrutinised, and should always be justified and accountable. Subject to the data protection legislation, what are the mechanisms for individuals to make sure that the information transferred is only the minimum necessary and only that which is sought? What guarantees are there that the individual knows what is being done with information held on him?

Angela Eagle: I understand the hon. Gentleman's fears, but he is making heavy weather of the issue. The power is specific and limited. I confirm that the powers conferred in subsequent clauses do not change responsibilities under the Data Protection Act for local authorities or the authorities that we will be discussing later, or compromise them in any way. The Data Protection Act continues to govern the type of information that can be held and the way in which it can be handed over.
 My hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow is right to say that the Act deals differently with non-sensitive and sensitive information. The clause deals with non-sensitive information that can confirm the whereabouts of a person whom the Secretary of State has reasonable grounds to believe is an immigration offender, who would be subject to deportation if he were discovered, and who may be working illegally and involved in other nefarious activities that it would be in the public interest to stop. 
 The hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey worries about the disclosure of such information. Within the narrow limits set by the clauses, its sharing and disclosure is in the public interest, with all the qualifications that I have set out. The hon. Gentleman should remember that such disclosures are legitimate if they comply with section 29 of the Data Protection Act, which facilitates disclosures for the prevention and detection of crime. That is what we are talking about. These are not sweeping powers that enable the immigration authorities to go on fishing expeditions. There has to be a reasonable suspicion that a named individual is an immigration offender before information about him can be sought from any of the authorities that we will be discussing in the next few clauses. 
 The hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Malins) asked about reasonableness. The reasonable belief has to be in the mind of the Secretary of State or those working in his stead--in this instance, the immigration authorities. It is not for local authorities or any of the other authorities to second-guess the reasonableness argument. They already have a duty, which these 
 clauses qualify, to disclose information in those circumstances if asked to do so. The clauses clarify that they have that requirement. 
 I was not certain what the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey was getting at when he talked about the electoral register. It would certainly be an offence for immigration offenders to be on the electoral register. The immigration service already has access to the electoral register when making inquiries: that is the first place it would go. It does not have to go to local authorities or any of those other organisations to check the electoral register. As far as I know it is a public document. We can all check it. The hon. Gentleman can get a CD-ROM of it and do all sorts of clever things with the information that he gets from it. We do not have to legislate to require that information to be shared, as it is in the public domain already. 
 I hope that the Committee will realise that nothing in the clause compromises the protections under the Data Protection Act. It is a necessary but focused power. A similar power has already been extended to deal with social security fraud, and it qualifies under section 29 of the Data Protection Act, because it is sought for the prevention and detection of crime. I hope that the Committee will be happy to allow that clarification, which will improve the effectiveness of the work that the immigration authorities do to combat overstaying, illegal working and immigration crime. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 100, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Simon Hughes: On a point of order, Mr. Hurst. I thank the Minister for the letter that has been sent to you, your co-Chairman and members of the Committee about Government amendments and new clauses. However, I want to register a protest about the fact that some of the amendments were tabled only today. My understanding of the Minister's undertaking to the Committee last week was that the amendments would be tabled on Tuesday. A number of Government amendments were tabled then, but two further starred amendments appeared today, including one relating to legal processes and leave for appeal. I should be grateful for an explanation of why they were not tabled with the others. It looks a bit odd for one of the most controversial amendments to appear two days later. Can we have an assurance that no more amendments are planned in Committee, and that these are all the amendments that will be tabled on the clauses that we have specifically put back to the end of the Committee to give us time to consider them?

Alan Hurst: As the hon. Gentleman will know, that is not a point of order for the Chair. It is up to the Minister whether she wishes to reply.

Angela Eagle: I do not wish to detain the Committee. Some amendments were tabled later than we had hoped. That was not deliberate, but a matter of necessity. They concern a complex area of law, and
 had to be right before they were tabled. I apologise to the Committee for their late arrival—it shows that it was wise that the Programming Sub-Committee agreed to my suggestion to have an extra day. We tabled them as quickly as possible for the convenience of the Committee but, regrettably, practicalities sometimes intervene.

Clause 101 - Inland Revenue

Simon Hughes: I beg to move amendment No. 321, in page 50, leave out lines 36 and 37 and insert—
'(a) the person has committed an offence under section 24(1)(a), (b), (c), (e) or (f) or 24A(1) of the Immigration Act 1971 (c. 77) (illegal entry, deception, &c.) and'. The Chairman: With this it will be convenient to take Government amendments Nos. 294 and 295.

Simon Hughes: Clause 101 concerns the disclosure of information by the Inland Revenue. My amendment would narrow the circumstances in which the Commissioners of the Inland Revenue could supply to the Secretary of State information for the purpose of establishing where a person is. The clause has the same purpose as the previous clause, but concerns the Inland Revenue rather than local authorities. My amendment is wider than Government amendment No. 294, which affects subsection (1)(b). My amendment would replace subsection (1)(a) with different wording, and its purpose will be obvious to the Committee.
 At present, the definition is non-legal and does not refer to any offences. It provides that the Secretary of State should be able to exercise the power when he or she reasonably suspects that the person does not have leave to enter or remain and it is not lawful for them to undertake employment. The Government amendment proposes a different formulation of subsection (1)(b). The two paragraphs are linked with the word ''and''. My amendment would replace the subsection (1)(a) with a prerequisite that the Secretary of State reasonably suspects an offence under the Immigration Act 1971, and the offences listed are those that the Minister listed earlier. 
 If we have a law about whether someone can be in this country or not, the prerequisite for the Secretary of State to act should be that he or she believes that that law has been broken. If I am wrong, I should be grateful if the Minister would explain the circumstances in which subsection (1)(a) could apply if an immigration offence had not been committed. I have not been able to think of any, and if there are not any such circumstances, I hope that she will consider my amendment favourably.

Angela Eagle: I hope that by referring to the Government amendments, I shall be able to satisfy the hon. Gentleman that they provide the clarification he seeks. His amendment would, unintentionally, widen the gateway to the Inland Revenue to include people who we would not want to include, which given the tenor of our recent debate I suspect is not his intention.
 The hon. Gentleman's amendment would enable the Inland Revenue to disclose information about people who had committed an immigration offence but had subsequently been granted leave to remain and were working legally. We do not want to capture those people. The Government amendments rectify a technical defect in the clause, which is designed to enable the Inland Revenue to disclose information from its records to the Secretary of State to establish the whereabouts of suspected immigration offenders. That is the same as the previous clause, but applies to the Inland Revenue rather than local authorities. 
 The gateway will operate when the Secretary of State reasonably suspects that a person is in the United Kingdom without leave and does not have permission to work, or that a person who has leave to enter or remain under temporary admission has undertaken employment in breach of their conditions. As with other immigration offences, the usual sanction for illegal working is removal from the United Kingdom rather than prosecution. That means that the Inland Revenue would not be able to disclose information to the Secretary of State using other provisions, such as the information gateway in section 19 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. 
 Amendment No. 294 replaces subsection (1)(b) to make it clear that the Inland Revenue may disclose information in respect of persons whom the Secretary of State reasonably suspects do not have leave to enter or remain and who do not have permission to work. If the amendment were not made, we could not ensure that the Inland Revenue could disclose information about illegal entrants working in the UK who have yet to be subject to a restriction prohibiting them from taking employment. That would be at odds with the purpose of the clause. The hon. Gentleman has tried to put right the defect in the clause, but his proposal would turn the information gateway into a sort of M6, which is much wider than we require for the purposes that I have set out.

Simon Hughes: I am persuaded by the Minister's argument that a breach of the past remedy should not be a cause for triggering the information. Why not use the formulation in clause 100?

Alan Hurst: Order. We cannot return to a previous clause.

Angela Eagle: All that I would say to the hon. Gentleman is that the clause deals with information about people who are working, and the context of the gateways that we are discussing is slightly different for all the clauses. The previous clause related to whereabouts, for example. The same wording throughout the clauses would not always provide the necessary solution. That is complex but true.

Simon Hughes: I know that the Minister realises that I am always entirely fair and reasonable, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
 Amendments made, No. 294, in page 50, line 38, leave out paragraph (b) and insert— 
'(b) that the person does not have permission to work in accordance with section 1(2) of the Immigration Act 1971 (c.77) (general principles).'.
 No. 295, in page 51, line 5, at end insert— 
 '(3) The Commissioners of Inland Revenue may supply the Secretary of State with information for the purpose of determining whether an applicant for naturalisation under the British Nationality Act 1981 (c.61) is of good character. 
 (4) The Commissioners of Inland Revenue may supply the Secretary of State with information for the purpose of applying, in the case of an applicant for entry clearance within the meaning of section 33 of the Immigration Act 1971 (c.77), a provision of rules under section 3 of that Act relating to maintenance or accommodation. 
 (5) Information supplied to the Secretary of State under any of subsections (1) to (4) may be supplied by him to another person only— 
 (a) for a purpose specified in any of those subsections, 
 (b) for the purpose of legal proceedings, or 
 (c) with consent (which may be general or specific) of the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, for a purpose for which the Commissioners could supply the information. 
 (6) A power of the Commissioners of Inland Revenue under this section— 
 (a) may be exercised on their behalf only by a person authorised (generally or specifically) for the purpose, and 
 (b) may be exercised despite any statutory or other requirement of confidentiality.'. —[Angela Eagle]
 Clause 101, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 102 - Police, &c. Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Simon Hughes: The Minister rightly said that the purposes for which information is collected may include the prevention of crime. She may remember the significant debates in both Houses during the passage of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 on whether the threshold should be crime or serious crime. I and my hon. Friends took the view that it should be serious crime. Does the test of good character referred to in the clause require an individual to be absolutely blameless—in other words, crime-free in all respects? Would the lower end of crime, such as speeding or parking offences or other summary offences, stand in the way of an application? What is the test and is there flexibility? Would administrative offences that are technically crimes prevent someone from qualifying, and justify the exchange of information for which the clause provides?

Angela Eagle: The good character test is always left to the discretion of the Secretary of State for naturalisation purposes. Such a test would be ludicrous if it meant that someone with a parking offence could not become a naturalised citizen. Criminal activities range from parking and summary offences to far more serious crimes, and the power of the Secretary of State to exercise discretion should take
 account of that. There is no fixed statutory means of achieving that, which is why the Secretary of State has discretion. Clearly, minor offences carry less weight. The clause deals with the facts that the Secretary of State needs to take into account to exercise discretion under the law. A pattern of less serious offences might lead to a refusal, as might a more serious offence. As I have explained, the law currently leaves decisions to the discretion of the Secretary of State.
 It is clear that inappropriate granting of British citizenship to people engaged in serious criminal activity is potentially harmful to public safety, so the clause provides a legal basis for chief officers of the police, the National Crime Squad, the National Criminal and Intelligence Service, HM Customs and Excise, certain contractors providing accommodation under the National Asylum Support Service and persons specified by order under section 20 of the 1999 Act to disclose information to the Secretary of State to verify good character for immigration purposes. 
 I hope that the hon. Gentleman will accept that such information plays an important role in the appropriate exercise of discretion. The clause ensures that it can properly be passed to the Secretary of State by those specified bodies.

Humfrey Malins: I can reinforce the point that good character is a difficult concept. In our courts, defendants often ask to be viewed as of good character when they have no previous convictions, have only a minor previous conviction or perhaps have a serious conviction but of a different nature that took place many years ago. I agree with the Minister that it is largely a matter of discretion, and that exercising it appropriately is not easy. I do not know what else I have to add; in fact, I am not even sure that it was worth adding what I have just said.

Simon Hughes: That was a perfectly reasonable addition, if I may say so. The Minister is, of course, right about the need for discretion. I was not suggesting otherwise, but merely wanted to discover whether certain preconditions applied.
 It would be useful to know at an appropriate point in our proceedings how many applications were made over the previous five years and how many were turned down on the basis of failing the good character test. Does the Home Secretary use a general guideline to determine whether people who have been turned down once on good character grounds should be able to apply again? Are guidelines available to apply certain standards? Could someone pass the test on a second application, having been turned down on the first?

Angela Eagle: Yes, there is always that chance because the Secretary of State has discretion. A pattern of good behaviour after an earlier criminal career might lead the Secretary of State to revisit an earlier decision. Common sense applies to discretion, which means exactly that. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will accept that, for the appropriate exercise of
 discretion, it is helpful if all relevant information is made available. That is what the gateway in the clause allows with respect to the named organisations.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 102 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 103 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 104 - Medical inspectors

Angela Eagle: I beg to move amendment No. 375, in page 51, line 31, leave out subsection (1) and insert—
 '(1) This section applies to a person if an immigration officer acting under Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971 (c.77) (control on entry, &c.) has brought the person to the attention of a medical inspector appointed under paragraph 1(2) of that Schedule.'.

Alan Hurst: With this we may take Government amendments Nos. 376 to 383.

Angela Eagle: The clause is a technical measure that is designed to provide a firm legal basis for existing disclosures by port medical inspectors to relevant health authorities in the UK in respect of passengers for whom, in the inspectors' opinion, the disclosure is deemed necessary for specified medical purposes. Port medical inspectors contribute to one of the Government's policies on health by helping to identify and treat infectious diseases, especially tuberculosis, in passengers arriving from overseas. However, they can achieve that only if the information obtained in the port medical inspection can be passed on to health service providers. That enables the hospital or other medical body to contact the person quickly and offer any health checks that may be desirable and in the interests of that person, his family, close contacts and the wider community.
 The amendments broaden the power of port medical inspectors to disclose information to relevant local NHS bodies about passengers referred to them by immigration officers. Their purpose is to bring the clause into line with existing practice by port medical inspectors. They also rectify three main defects in the clause. 
 First, the amendments remove the requirement that a passenger must be examined before a port medical officer can disclose information to a relevant local health authority body. It is not always appropriate to examine certain passengers, such as pregnant women, for illnesses like tuberculosis that can involve the use of X-rays. Secondly, they remove the reference in the clause to notifiable diseases under the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984. It is no longer appropriate to link the power to disclose information to that Act, because its definition of notifiable disease and the strictures that apply in those cases are not relevant to port powers of disclosure, which cover a wider range of general public health requirements. The amendments provide a gateway that permits the disclosure of information necessary for preventive medicine, medical diagnosis, the provision of care or treatment or the management of health care services. 
 Thirdly, they remove the need for the port medical inspector to have reasonable suspicion that a person is infected with a disease. In practice, it would be difficult for port medical inspectors to satisfy that test, especially at smaller port health units where facilities are limited. The amendments provide that a port medical inspector may disclose information if he thinks that that is necessary for medical purposes. That reserves a necessary degree of clinical judgment to the port medical inspector. 
 The amendments add the age of the passenger and the language spoken to the list of information that a port medical inspector is empowered to disclose, as they are highly relevant to the provision of follow-up health services. 
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendments made: No. 376, in page 51, line 34, leave out 'The' and insert 'A'. 
 No. 377, in page 51, line 35, leave out 'the person examined' and insert: 
 'a person to whom this section applies'. 
 No. 378, in page 51, line 36, at end insert: 
 '( ) his age, 
 ( ) the language which he speaks,'. 
 No. 379, in page 51, line 37, leave out 'the disease' and insert: 
 'any disease with which the inspector thinks the person may be infected'. 
 No. 380, in page 51, line 39, leave out 'the inspector's suspicion' and insert: 
 'an opinion mentioned in paragraph (c)'. 
 No. 381, in page 51, line 40, leave out: 
 'he has arranged to have carried out)' 
 and insert 'has been carried out)'. 
 No. 382, in page 51, line 42, at end insert: 
 '( ) A disclosure may be made under subsection (2) only if the medical inspector thinks it necessary for the purpose of— 
 (a) preventative medicine, 
 (b) medical diagnosis, 
 (c) the provision of care or treatment, or 
 (d) the management of health care services.'
 No. 383, in page 52, line 15, leave out subsection (4).—[Angela Eagle.] 
 Clause 104, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 105 - employer

Angela Eagle: I beg to move No. 296, in page 52, line 26, leave out 'the earnings of'.

Alan Hurst: With this it will be convenient to take Government amendments Nos. 297 and 298.

Angela Eagle: If the Secretary of State has reasonable suspicion that someone has committed an immigration offence, including an offence in relation to earnings under the national asylum support arrangements, the clause gives him the power to
 require the employer to disclose information about that person's earnings, employment history and whereabouts.
 Sitting suspended for a Division in the House. 
 On resuming—

Angela Eagle: The provision also applies to employment agencies hiring out the services of staff, even if those staff are technically self-employed or employed by a third party. The purpose of the clause is twofold: first, to strengthen the immigration and nationality directorate's ability to detect and prevent fraud in the national asylum support arrangements by applicants who claim to be destitute but fail to declare or under-declare their true level of earnings, which costs the UK about £60 million each year; and, secondly, to strengthen the IND's ability to locate immigration offenders at large in the community with a view to effecting their removal. The clause makes it clear that even if the IND does not intend to prosecute the employees concerned, the employer has no lawful excuse for not providing the information specified.
 The degree to which employers currently comply with legitimate requests for information from the immigration service varies widely. Provision for the power to be enforced is made in clauses 107, 108 and 109. An employer commits an offence if he fails to comply with a request for information without reasonable excuse, or makes a false declaration. If the employer does not have some or all of the information requested, all he has to do is to declare that that is the case. 
 The purpose of these technical amendments is to clarify the circumstance in which the Secretary of State may require employers to provide information. Consequently, the same information can be provided in respect of all classes of immigration offence, depending on the purpose for which the Secretary of State requires the information. The clause is an important part of our determination to fight illegal working, and to ensure that people cannot with impunity disappear into the system in the knowledge that we will not catch up with them. In order significantly to enhance our ability in that respect, we need to create certainty so that those employers who are approached know that they must comply with these modest and focused requirements for information. 
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendments made: No. 297, in page 52, line 27, at end insert— 
 '( ) section 24(1)(a), (b), (c), (e) or (f), 24A(1) or 26(1)(c) or (d) of the Immigration Act 1971 (c.77) (illegal entry, deception, &c.),'.
No. 298, in page 52, line 32, leave out subsection (2) and insert— 
 '(2) The power under subsection (1) may be exercised to require information about an employee only if the information— 
 (a) is required for the purpose of establishing where the employee is, or 
 (b) relates to the employee's earnings or to the history of his employment.'.—[Angela Eagle.]
 Clause 105, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 106 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 107 - Notice

Humfrey Malins: I beg to move amendment No. 305, in page 53, line 24, after 'State', insert 'and the person affected'.

Alan Hurst: With this we may take amendment No. 323, in page 53, line 25, at end insert
'and a copy of the notice, in respect of the person affected'.

Humfrey Malins: Clauses 105 and 106 give the Secretary of State the power to require certain people, including employers and banks, to provide financial information about a person who may be working for them. I understand the obvious need for such a power, but it raises the usual issues, because we do not want the requests to become a fishing expedition.
 I appreciate the need for confidentiality. This is a probing amendment to ask the Government to give a fuller explanation of what will happen in practice when a notice is served on a bank, for example. My amendment provides that the person on whom the notice is served—it is likely to be a bank—must provide the Secretary of State and the person affected with the information specified. That is another way of saying, ''Is there an argument or not?'' When the bank or employer responds, they should be saying to the employee who is the subject of the inquiry, ''Look, I have had this request from the Secretary of State about your financial position. This is the information I am going to provide. We'd better check whether it's accurate, because I don't want there to be a mistake''. Normally, natural justice would require the person affected by the notice to see it, as well as the response to it. 
 If it is the Government's view that drawing the notice to the attention of the affected person would result in that person doing a bunk and not being accountable, I can see the purpose of the provision. I tabled the amendment as a peg on which to draw a little more information from the Government. They will know that the debate on whether the clause should stand part of the Bill needs to be approached sensitively rather than heavy-handedly.

Simon Hughes: Our amendment would have a similar effect. If the Government are to resist the amendments for the reason anticipated by the hon. Member for Woking, there is still the issue of when the
 employee or the customer of the financial institution should be notified and given the information. As the hon. Gentleman said, the Government may resist the amendments because they do not want the individual to be tipped off. Nonetheless, it is important for the person to know where the information came from so that inaccuracies can be dealt with.
 A firm that is no longer based in my constituency was subject to a routine check by the Department of Employment—as it was then—on whether all the employees were lawfully engaged. I assume that there had been a tip off. There was a comic side, because the management was entirely white and the workforce entirely black—Ghanaian, I believe. The inspectors asked the management in the front office if they could go through to the shop floor. They were told by the managing director's wife, who was on duty, that they could of course go through to the shop floor, see the workforce and speak to whomever they wanted. The inspectors went through to the rear part of the building where the work was being done, returned a few minutes later and said, ''Is this a tea break? Where is the workforce?'' Every member of staff had disappeared after being tipped off, whether they were here legitimately or not. 
 It is important that people should know about the suspected case against them. That is the secondary purpose of our amendment. Its primary purpose is to notify the individual concerned and the employer or financial institution simultaneously.

Rosie Winterton: The hon. Member for Woking asked for more information about the mechanisms. The clause provides the Secretary of State with a legal mechanism to require employers and financial institutions to supply information using the powers in clauses 105 and 106. The clause also provides that requests for information will be made in the form of a written notice, and sets out the manner and minimum period in which recipients of a notice must respond.
 Subsection (1) provides that a request for information under clauses 105 or 106 must be imposed by written notice. Subsection (1)(a) provides that the notice must specify the information required; subsection (1)(b) that it must specify the manner in which the information is to be provided; and subsection (1)(c) that it must state the period of time within which the information is to be provided. 
 Subsection (2) defines the period of time specified in the notice within which the recipient must respond. Subsection (2)(a) states that the period must begin with the date of receipt of the notice, and subsection (2)(b) states that it must be not less than 10 working days. Subsection (3) specifies the duties placed on the recipient of a notice. The recipient must provide the Secretary of State with the information specified in the notice, or a declaration that he does not have any of the information specified, or that he does not have the remainder if he can provide only part of it. Other parts of the clause relate to matters such as the definition of the ''working day''. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will not want me to go into the details of that.
 We will consult publicly on the application of the powers in clauses 105 and 106 before they are implemented. We will certainly try to encourage voluntary compliance by employees and financial institutions wherever possible. The purpose of the proposed new information powers in clauses 105, 106 and 107 is to assist the Secretary of State to locate immigration offenders at large within the community, and to detect and prevent fraud of the national asylum support arrangements, which costs the UK taxpayer an estimated £60 million per annum. All hon. Members would recognise that it is important for us to do that. That fraud is not only a cost to the taxpayer, it undermines the position of people who are genuinely trying to seek asylum and become refugees. 
 Amendment No. 305 would require an employer or financial institution served with a notice requiring disclosure to provide the persons affected by the notice with a copy of any information supplied to the Secretary of State. That would alert the person concerned to the fact that they were under investigation, which the hon. Gentleman touched on, and would increase the risk of that person absconding or destroying evidence of offending. It would completely undermine the proposed policy. There is no point catching only the individual offender: we need to be able to find out how things have been organised so that we can take matters further. Whenever the protection of information applies, it is difficult to give that information immediately to the offender. Again, the data protection legislation applies. 
 Amendment No. 323 is very similar in intent to the lead amendment. They would both inhibit the Government's efforts to tackle illegal working and fraud of the NASS scheme. I hope that that explains more clearly why the information is necessary, and why it would not be helpful to pass it on to the person to whom it applies. I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.

Humfrey Malins: This has been a helpful and short debate. With the Minister's additional explanations, I am happy to beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 107 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clauses 108 and 109 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 110 - privilege against self-incrimination

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Neil Gerrard: I think that I understand some of the reasons for the clause, but a number of hon. Members are concerned about aspects of illegal working. We shall come later to the issue of trafficking for sexual purposes, but there is also a growing trend in trafficking for labour purposes—a modern form of slavery. There is no question but that people are trafficked and deliberately exploited for labour.
 We must be sure that we are not introducing a provision that makes it difficult to get at the employers responsible for such exploitation. I am slightly worried that we are introducing a protection for an employer who has given information, particularly under clause 105. The answer may be that we must be careful how we use the provisions, and that we should target the people who are trafficking for labour in other ways. I know that the Government intend to deal with the issue—next year, we hope—in criminal justice legislation, but I seek reassurance that nothing in the Bill will hinder our ability to get at employers who traffic in labour and exploit extremely vulnerable people.

Rosie Winterton: I hope that I can reassure my hon. Friend. I understand his point about the need to act on that problem and, as he said, we hope to introduce legislation in respect of trafficking for illegal working.
 Clause 110 provides that information supplied by a person under clauses 105 and 106 cannot be used as evidence in criminal proceedings. We intend to avoid any conflict between those clauses and the right to a fair trial guaranteed by article 6 of the European convention on human rights. There is no intention to undermine future legislation, but we must ensure compatibility with the ECHR, so we have to provide for privilege against self-incrimination in this legislation to make that clear. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 110 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 111 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 112 - Assisting Unlawful Immigration, &c.

Alan Hurst: With this it will be convenient to take the following amendments: No. 330, in page 56, line 22, leave out '14' and insert '5'.
 No. 329, in page 56, line 22, leave out '14' and insert '2'.

Simon Hughes: Amendment No. 330 is an alternative to amendment No. 329. We have moved swiftly to part 7 on offences, which is the last substantive part programmed for consideration today. The amendments relate to the first proposed new offence, which will replace the definition of the offence in section 25 of the 1971 Act with the more widely drawn offence of assisting unlawful immigration to a member state. The second provision in the clause covers the similar but different offence of helping asylum seekers to enter the UK.
 The new offences should not be so widely drawn. Various phrases do not appear to have a prehistory in other immigration legislation, and some look as if they will be difficult to understand and interpret, not least because they require an understanding of other nations' immigration law as well as our own. Other phrases are also difficult to work out, such as those in new sections 25(1) and (2) about travel within the state. There is the question of how severe the penalty should be in order to draw up a league table that puts penalties in an appropriate hierarchy so that there are no inappropriately severe ones. 
 Amendment No. 324 would add ''and for gain'' to the provision on the new offence of assisting unlawful immigration to a member state. We tabled the amendment because we believe that the clause's purpose is to try to stop the illegal trafficking of people, especially women and children for sexual exploitation, as the hon. Member for Walthamstow noted. That is entirely proper, but I have a general question for the Minister. Would it not be more appropriate to include that offence in sexual offences legislation? I understand that such legislation is on the stocks, and that the Home Office has consulted on it and issued a White Paper. The Government may say perfectly reasonably that they want to include that offence in the Bill to catch people early. That is fine, but its eventual destination is the sexual offences legislation, when it is brought before Parliament. 
 On alternative penalties, the penalty for the offence in new section 25(6) is 
''on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years, to a fine or to both, or...to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or to both.'' 
The suggestion is that if we have a 14-year maximum penalty for an offence as it is currently described, we shall not follow the nature of the penalties in the Bill or distinguish between the offences of trafficking for the purpose of exploitation, which is extremely serious, and facilitating that, which is a lesser offence. People might be agents or aide and abet down the line, but while some are directly involved in bringing harm to someone, others are either not involved or involved only indirectly. 
 What thought have the Government given to that differential and what consultations have taken place on whether the Bill provides for the right penalties? Practitioners have told me that there should be different penalties for different offences, and it would be helpful if the Minister told us what consultations have taken place, what responses the Government have received and their justification for the proposed penalties.

Rosie Winterton: This is obviously an important clause, which replaces section 25 of the 1971 Act with four new sections. The current section 25 makes it an offence knowingly to assist illegal entry to the UK or to help someone to obtain leave to remain in the UK illegally by means including deception. The first major change is that the first new section extends the offence
 to encompass assisting someone to enter, travel within or remain in any European Union member state in breach of the laws of that state.
 The facilitation of illegal entry—the hon. Gentleman has used that phrase—is increasingly the work of organised criminal gangs. Those gangs do not respect international boundaries, and new section 25 will enable the UK to participate in a joint approach to combating the crime on a European, rather than simply a national, basis. That is extremely important if we want to combat the problem effectively. 
 As the hon. Gentleman said, the second major change is that the maximum penalty for the reformulated and expanded offences is increased from 10 years' imprisonment and/or an unlimited fine to 14 years and/or an unlimited fine. Although the current maximum meets our European obligations, we made it clear that we consider such crimes particularly abhorrent and therefore want a higher maximum penalty. We believe that 14 years is appropriate. 
 The third change relates to harbouring an immigration offender. That is a separate offence under section 25(2) of the 1971 Act, but it will be subsumed in the new offence because it constitutes assisting someone to breach immigration laws by being in the UK when they have no right to be here. 
 Amendment No. 324 would limit the offence of facilitating illegal entry to cases where that is done ''for gain''. An exemption to protect people who facilitate such entry for motives other than gain is appropriate in the case of asylum claimants, but we do not believe that there is justification for assisting someone to enter the UK illegally. Such a breach of immigration law should be an offence, whether or not the motivation is profit. The amendment is not only undesirable in principle, but unworkable in practice. 
 Amendments Nos. 329 and 330 offer a choice of maximum penalty for facilitating illegal entry—two years or five. Only two years ago, the penalty for that offence was increased from seven years to 10 in response to comments from the judiciary that the former maximum was insufficient to deal with the most serious facilitations. Having taken those points into account and to show how seriously we take such activity, we propose 14 years as appropriate rather than 10. I hope that the hon. Gentleman withdraws his amendment.

Simon Hughes: How many convictions have there been under the law and what is the range of penalties? The Minister says that the tariff was raised two years ago as a result of representations from the judiciary. Has there been further consultation and has any view been expressed that a penalty of 10 years is not enough? Should the offences of trafficking and of facilitating have the same upper limit? I understand the distinction that the Government draw between the offence that we are discussing and that concerning asylum seekers, which we shall discuss under the next clause, but is there not a case for setting different upper limits for the trafficking offences and the more remote facilitating offences?

Rosie Winterton: I shall quickly answer the hon. Gentleman's question on sexual offences. We are dealing with such offences under other legislation. The current legislation deals with inter-country problems, but an assurance has been given that the issue is being looked at. I do not know how many convictions there have been, but I shall attempt to find out.
 On the hon. Gentleman's point about the difference between the offences of facilitating and trafficking, it is important that we send a clear message on the offences. The judiciary commented on the issue and its views, with public opinion saying that we must take firm action, made us decide to set such maximum penalties.

Simon Hughes: I shall reflect on what the Minister has said, and I am grateful for the information that she has given. It would be helpful if she came back with the figures on convictions and tariffs, because the debate is wide and important, and it will continue beyond the Committee. The amendment is probing and I am happy to withdraw it. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Simon Hughes: I beg to move amendment No. 325, in page 55, line 32, leave out from ''Union'' to end of line 35.

Alan Hurst: With this we may discuss the following amendments: No. 306, in page 55, line 36, leave out ''a member State'' and insert ''the United Kingdom''.
 No. 327, in page 55, line 38, leave out ''State'' and insert ''United Kingdom''. 
 No. 328, in page 55, line 40, leave out from beginning to ''or''. 
 No. 332, in page 57, line 4, leave out from ''Union'' to end of line 7.

Simon Hughes: We are moving down the page to the next issues. Amendment No. 306, which we have tabled with the hon. Member for Woking and his hon. Friends, would ensure that the offence is clearly defined. Amendment No. 325 would remove new section 25(1)(b) and leave the offence as knowingly facilitating
''the commission of a breach of immigration law by an individual who is not a citizen of the European Union''.
 The Minister and hon. Members will agree that new section 25(1)(b) is a far more subjective test. It will make it an offence for you, Mr. Hurst, or I to do something that we have 
''reasonable cause to believe may facilitate the commission'' 
of offences, even if no eventual offence is committed. That is rather like the riddle on the theft legislation about whether one can conspire to steal something that is not there to be stolen. Is it right that it should become an offence to do something that one thinks may be illegal, even if it is not? 
 Amendment No. 306 would limit the provision to UK law rather than that of any EU member state. We shall have a debate in another context on the extradition legislation—European arrest warrants and 
 so on will be on the agenda—and when the law here should act in relation to occurrences in other member states. Practitioners and others point out that it will be difficult for magistrates and judges here to interpret the immigration law in France, Belgium, Italy, Portugal or elsewhere. It is difficult enough to work it out in this country. The task will be almost impossible and potentially delaying for the courts, so I ask the Minister to get rid of those proposals as they stand. That would also be the effect of amendment No. 327. 
 Amendment No. 328 would remove the phrase ''travel within the State'', thereby limiting the offence to a law controlling entry to a state or someone being in the state. In theory, all sorts of laws could govern our right to travel within states, yet it is not blindingly obvious which the Bill is aiming at. It would be helpful if the Government explained that point. I do not have the knowledge or expertise to know the answer, but I am told that this phrase is previously unknown in UK immigration law. Is that right? If so, why is it being introduced? 
 Amendment No. 332 relates to the proposed new offence of assisting entry to the United Kingdom in breach of a deportation order. It should be limited to knowingly facilitating a breach of a deportation order in force, and not depend on subjective assessment of whether the accused has committed an offence. I am sorry that we are in complicated areas of definition. You, above all, Mr. Hurst, know how important it is for the law to be clear, so that people know where they stand. I hope that the Government seriously consider the amendment.

Angela Watkinson: I shall speak to amendment No. 306. Subsection (2) defines immigration law as
''a law which has effect in a member State''. 
The amendment would replace ''member State'' with ''the United Kingdom''. The clause begs the question whether our magistrates, judges and juries can be expected to have specific knowledge of, or the ability to interpret, the complex immigration law of other member states. The explanatory notes state: 
 ''This is a measure required to enable the United Kingdom to comply with Article 27 of the Schengen Convention.'' 
To the best of my knowledge, and the Minister will correct me if I am wrong, this country is not a signatory to that convention. The notes continue: 
 ''It will also assist compliance with a European Directive on Unauthorised Entry, Transit and Residence and its associated Framework Decision, which have yet to be formally adopted.'' 
The clause suggests that our courts will try cases involving foreign laws. If so, what special training is required? Alternatively, will such cases—like extradition, they are a highly specialised field—be tried only in Bow street court? If only a limited number of judges and magistrates have sufficient knowledge to handle those cases, that may not be the best way to avoid a backlog. I would be grateful for the Minister's clarification.

Rosie Winterton: Amendments Nos. 306, 327 and 328 would confine the offences to actions that breach UK law, but that runs counter to the purpose of the new section. If we accept the amendments, we might as well retain existing section 25 and increase the penalty. A common European approach is necessary and justified; otherwise, we could not implement reciprocal arrangements. Time and again action is demanded on a European level, so being unable to implement reciprocal arrangements would defeat the whole object. Magistrates are required to know the laws of other member states, particularly in this context.

Humfrey Malins: The Minister says that we already require magistrates to know the laws of other member states. On what authority does she say so? What judicial training courses over the last two years have focused specifically on those matters? I do not believe that such knowledge is currently required.

Rosie Winterton: I shall endeavour to find out further information on training courses. Magistrates must be able to read the certificates prescribed by member states; it is part of the process. We cannot expect intimate knowledge, but awareness of and ability to understand different certificates is important.

Simon Hughes: This complicated issue intrigues and slightly troubles me. I understand that English judges, magistrates and district judges enforce English law, European Union law and, in the case of the Bow street magistrate, extradition law. That will be expanded under Government legislation, but their job does not currently involve enforcing the law of other member states. Our jurisdiction does not say that it is an offence here to break the law of another member state. We extradite people if they have committed an offence in another member state; we do not try them here. Surely that must be right.

Rosie Winterton: The point is that, where we have reciprocal arrangements, judges and magistrates must be aware of what becomes European law. There are instances of that, and eventually what we are discussing will become part of it. In respect of the offences that we are debating and reciprocal arrangements, there must be that knowledge. I am happy to pursue the question of any other type of training later, but with regard to including facilitation of breaches of immigration law of other member states, magistrates would have to do what I said to comply with reciprocal arrangements.
 An offence of assisting illegal transit across the state does not exist in UK law, but other member states may have laws on that, which is why it was included in the European directive. The reference in new section 25(2) to a law that controls entitlement to travel within the state is intended to cover that and seemed a sensible way to capture the various laws that may regulate illegal transit in other member states. Of course, it is difficult to transit across a state without travelling within it. 
 Amendments Nos. 325 and 332 would make prosecution for the offence of facilitation extremely difficult. In many cases, the facilitator may not know 
 the precise provision of immigration law that is being breached. Even where he does know, that would be difficult to prove in all circumstances. However, whether he knows or not, the circumstances may be such that he has reasonable grounds to believe that he is committing some offence. 
 Under the clause, the prosecution would succeed if it showed that the facilitator had reasonable grounds to believe that he was committing a breach of immigration law. The provision is vital and will become even more so when the offence is expanded to include breaches of the laws of other EU member states. If we are to take action on this matter, it is important to have a robust system for doing so. The amendments would be unworkable in practice, so we cannot accept them. 
 Sitting suspended. 
 On resuming—

Rosie Winterton: To sum up, we should be clear about the certification process and how we see the court process working. If a prosecution were taking place we would ask the Government of another member state for a certificate under new section 25(3) of the Immigration Act 1971. A certificate from Italy, for example, would state that it was an offence under Italian law to take someone across Italy from Albania. If we were prosecuting a person in our courts and had evidence that that had taken place, the certificate would prove conclusively that it was an offence and it would not be necessary to revisit the matter in court. That is the idea of the certificate. Magistrates will not know about all the laws of every member state, but the certification process will provide courts with conclusive proof of what those laws state. Any training would be on how the new system worked, not necessarily on the substance of all the laws in other countries.

Humfrey Malins: If the offence committed in Italy carried a maximum sentence of five years, could our courts sentence up to 14 years, or vice versa?

Rosie Winterton: Yes. I believe that in most cases we would be looking at a number of offences that had been committed, and not only here: evidence could be used from other countries too. As hon. Members know, this type of activity is certainly cross-border and across other member states. When bringing together a case we should have as much evidence as possible. Naturally, the laws that we will apply would be our British laws in our court.

Simon Hughes: We may return to some wider questions. Does the Minister accept that there are several difficulties already? First, the offence of crossing Italy to go to Albania—to use her example—might have various component elements to make it an offence under Italian law. For example, a person might have to be over 18, act knowingly or commit the act more than once. Offences are defined in different ways, and a person would have to know that.
 Secondly, if an act is an offence in another country, why would it be dealt with here?

Rosie Winterton: May I return to the hon. Gentleman's first point about the certification process? If the offence were to be an offence, it would have to be stated that Italian law provides that taking a person across Italy is not an offence if a person is under 18. The law should be on the certificate to ensure that that does not cause argument in the British court. If an accused person who was under 18 argued that a person had to be over 18 to commit an offence under Italian law, there could be an argument about that, but it would be up to the court to decide. I hope that that helps.
 Will the hon. Gentleman remind me of his other question?

Simon Hughes: Why would we not send people back to be dealt with in the Italian court?

Rosie Winterton: All other procedures, such as extradition proceedings, may apply—the measure does not overrule that. Organised activities will occur in many different countries. In building a case against an individual, given the severe penalties that we are discussing, it would be in everybody's best interests to get all relevant evidence in one place. In the scenario in which the person was tried here, we would want to take account of other information. Offences might have been committed in other countries, but it may be judged that it would help the prosecution by proceeding in that way rather than another way.

Humfrey Malins: If we deal with an offence under Italian immigration law that is tried in this country, will Italian rules of evidence apply or will ours? Are we really giving ourselves power of sentence that might be well above what a person might get for the same offence if it were tried in Italy?

Rosie Winterton: If we tried a person in this country, we would believe that they had committed an offence here. However, the inclusion of evidence of offences that we believed had been committed in other countries might strengthen our prosecution case. I emphasise that the point of the certificate is not to pass a judgment on what an individual might have done, but to say that it is an offence to do X in Italy. No judgment would be made about the individual, because the certificate would simply state what is an offence in that country. It would be for the court to decide whether the person committed that offence. For example, if the person who was being prosecuted had been on a long journey, there might be evidence that offences had been committed in several countries. It is important that we have the ability to bring that to the court's attention, so that we can substantiate our evidence that an offence has been committed here.
 I hope that that helps to clarify the position.

Angela Watkinson: I wish to press the Minister a little further. Will every court be expected to be competent in dealing with those cases, or are they all likely to be concentrated in a single specialist court, such as that at Bow street?

Rosie Winterton: I expect that many of those cases will not take place in magistrates courts, because of the nature of the offences and the penalties that they attract. However, we hope that the courts will be sufficiently competent to deal with such complicated situations

Simon Hughes: This matter raises many interesting points, some of which will be addressed again on clause stand part, and one of which will be raised again in the second of the further group of amendments. I give notice that I will not seek a Division on this amendment.
 I understand the argument that trafficking is—by definition—a transnational issue, and that it would be especially useful, for securing a conviction, if one had evidence that more than one frontier had been crossed and that there was more than one jurisdiction. 
 I still think that issues are raised here that tread new ground. For instance, is this a new type of legislating? The Minister may have an opportunity to reflect on that—or to take advice on it—before the clause stand part debate. I am not aware that we have previously made law in this way, which is outside straightforward domestic law, European Union law and European human rights law—both of which are now applied in our domestic courts—and extradition law, which is when we respond to an application from another country. 
 The courts are used to taking evidence of what is the law in foreign countries. For instance, in a wardship of a child case, they might take evidence as to what is the law in—let us say—an American state, to work out whether its courts would grant responsibility for the child to the mother. I understand the issue, and we may wish to return to it for the reasons that the amendments prompt. 
 I ask the Minister to reflect on the fact that it appears that, if this goes through, one could be found guilty in an English court—and the same would apply in a court in Scotland and Northern Ireland—for thinking that one was committing an offence here under, let us say, Italian law, even though one was not doing so. We will convict people who have reasonable cause for thinking—perhaps because somebody has told them—that they are committing an offence under Greek law, even though, in fact, what they have done is not an offence, even under Greek law. That pushes the credibility of what one should be convicted for over a couple of lines, beyond which we would not normally be happy to go. That issue might unite hon. Members of all parties—it is not a party political matter. 
 We will also need to return to the point about travel within the state. I understand offences relating to entering and leaving states, crossing boundaries and so forth, but I am not aware that it is an offence to travel within the UK. It is an offence to enter illegally, and it may even be an offence to leave illegally, but I am not aware of travel within the UK being an offence. We appear to be introducing something without precedent. 
 Having listened to the Minister's argument and understood the background to the Government's thinking, I think that we should return to the issues 
 raised in the amendments. I understand that pressure is coming from European Union initiatives, and I shall return to that matter in the clause stand part debate. For the time being, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Simon Hughes: I beg to move amendment No. 331, in page 56, leave out lines 26 to 44.

Alan Hurst: With this we may discuss the following amendments: No. 307, in page 56, line 28 leave out 'and for gain'.
 No. 309, in page 56, line 41 after 'organisation', insert 'approved by the Secretary of State'. 
 No. 308, in page 56, line 42, leave out '(7)' and insert '(6)'.

Simon Hughes: Clause 112 is a portmanteau clause that creates a series of new offences. The amendments relate to the second of those, which is helping an asylum seeker to enter the UK. The last debate concerned assisting unlawful immigration between member states, and the two offences are markedly different for obvious reasons. The amendment would remove proposed new section 25A.
 I expect that the Minister's initial objection would be that it is wrong to seek to smuggle someone into the UK as an asylum seeker for personal profit. There is already an exemption in 25A(3), which states that one cannot be found guilty if one is acting on behalf of an organisation that exists to assist asylum seekers. However, let us forget for one moment the point about ''for gain''. Suppose that when I went to Kosovo with the hon. Member for Walthamstow and the former Member for Fareham, Peter Lloyd, and met a family in desperate straits as a result of the civil war. If I got a telephone call a week after my return from one of the family wishing to seek asylum in the UK, it should not be an offence for me to try to get them into the UK. To put it bluntly, I should be entitled to help people to seek asylum if I think it proper. It is immoral to make that an offence. 
 It would be different if I was acting for personal or corporate gain or profit, and amendment No. 307 addresses that issue. I do not think it wrong for me knowingly to facilitate the arrival in the UK of someone I believe to be an asylum seeker. We have a nonsense system at the moment, as I have endlessly said to the Minister and his colleagues. There is no legal way into Britain for an asylum seeker. If there is civil war in Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone, the horn of Africa, Iraq or Iran, and people from such countries wish to seek asylum, there is no legitimate way for them to put their cases to come to the UK without getting here. If they are honest with the system, there is no way that they can get here legally. 
 People such as myself have always maintained that one ought to be able to apply for asylum in the UK either in the country from which one is fleeing, or if that is not safe, in the nearest possible country. One should be able to go to the British Embassy, high commission or consulate, a UNHCR office or Red Cross office and say, ''I want to come to the UK.''
 That is why we have argued that it would be a good thing for British officials to be on the other side of the channel to process applications for asylum. People in Sangatte could then put their cases to the British authorities and have them dealt with there, ideally under the umbrella of the UNHCR or a similar body. 
 Apart from the ''for gain'' point, which I understand, I would hope that by the time the Bill becomes law, we shall have removed the provision. If we are to honour our international obligations, under which people are entitled to put a case for and be granted asylum, both of which are legitimate in international law, it should not be an offence to help someone to find asylum here. I do not understand how the first obligation in international law is compatible with making that an offence.

Angela Watkinson: I want to speak to amendments Nos. 307 to 309. I shall discuss amendment No. 308 first, because in that one I sense a slight whiff of success.
 The clause refers in subsection (4) to ''subsections (4) to (7)'', but try as I may, I have been unable to find subsection (7). I believe that the previous section ends at subsection (6), so I may have detected a drafting error. 
 Amendment No. 307 would amend subsection (1) by omitting the words ''and for gain'', a phrase that requires additional explanation. If criminal racketeers conduct such enterprise, clearly they do it for gain—considerable gain, in most cases—and should be punished most severely. However, others who would be subject to the Bill, such as members of an asylum seeker's family or other misguided individuals, might act for altruistic reasons or for the greater good or corporate gain, for example. Does the word ''gain'' in subsection (1) mean only financial gain? Other forms of gain may be involved. Would they be covered, too? 
 Amendment No. 309 is merely a probing amendment. New section 25A(3) seems to create a defence for 
''a person acting on behalf of an organisation which aims to assist asylum-seekers.'' 
Anyone could create such an organisation, which need not be large and could be a front for criminality. That should be avoided at all costs. We suggest that the Secretary of State must approve the organisation. For example, the Refugee Council and the Immigration Advisory Service, which was established by my hon. Friend the Member for Woking, would obviously be approved by the Secretary of State, whereas others might not. The requirement would tighten up the interpretation of the word ''organisation'' in the clause and would avoid a possible loophole being created.

Rosie Winterton: I hope that I shall be able to give some reassurances. As has been said, the current offence of facilitating the entry of an asylum claimant does not apply to anything done other than for gain. The provision was inserted by the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. It is a linear descendant of the provision inserted by the Asylum and Immigration Act 1996, which is sometimes referred to as the good Samaritan defence.
 I refer first to the example given by the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey. Under new section 25A(1), 
 ''A person commits an offence if...he knowingly and for gain facilitates the arrival'' 
of an asylum seeker. The hon. Gentleman is not talking about illegal entry. If he were to assist someone in making an illegal entry—for example, if he smuggled them in, one way or another, after his visit—that would be an offence. If someone, having entered the UK, reports and claims asylum, an illegal entry has been made, but the hon. Gentleman's scenario is not about facilitating illegal entry in that way. 
 Once someone has entered the UK, they are an illegal entrant, whether or not they subsequently claim asylum, and the facilitator has committed the offence, whether or not they are acting for gain. Even if the hon. Gentleman were acting from the best of reasons, it would be problematic for him to assist an illegal entry. The offence does not relate to assisting a person who comes to the UK and claims asylum without attempting to avoid immigration control or to pass through illegally. The hon. Gentleman would therefore be covered in the scenario that he has outlined. 
 The hon. Member for Upminster (Angela Watkinson) referred to the issue of what is, and what is not, ''for gain''. Of course there is financial gain, which is fairly clear, but one could also include services in kind or for drugs, and so on. ''Gain'' would have to expand to include that; it would not be limited just to gains made in cash, for obvious reasons that I am sure we all understand. Without the consideration of gain, there is no offence.

Simon Hughes: I should like to compare two examples: the case of someone who comes here as a visitor or student and asks for asylum is covered—they cross the border legally, because they come with status—and that of a Kosovan who could not get a visa and came here intending, from the moment he left Kosovo, to seek asylum. Clearly, as one cannot make an application from Kosovo to come to the UK as an asylum seeker, they would have to cross with no status. I assume that it will still be perfectly lawful for me to help that person to leave Kosovo with no prearranged visa. Such a person should be able to land in the UK and apply for asylum, because otherwise the key and obvious objective could not be met.

Rosie Winterton: The issue is someone passing through immigration control without presenting themselves and saying ''I claim asylum.'' Illegal entry is coming into the country without doing that—arriving and immediately saying ''I claim asylum'' is different.
 We recognise, as did the previous Administration, that there may be cases in which people are motivated by humanitarian considerations and provide assistance for people in danger to get here. That is why we resist amendment No. 307.
 We do not accept that organised criminal gangs should be free to import people into the United Kingdom with impunity. That would be the effect of amendment No. 331, although I cannot imagine that it was the intention behind it. 
 The original offence contained a protection for employees of organisations that exist to help refugees. Clearly, individuals who earn a salary could be said to be acting for gain, but not in a way that could be regarded as reprehensible. I am not persuaded that an approved list would be appropriate because it would be difficult to maintain and keep up to date. Our approach towards such good Samaritan cases would be on a case-by-case basis, and it would be inappropriate to have a list. However, we will seek to refine the definition of organisations for the purpose of the clause, and if appropriate, we hope to return on Report with a clearer definition. However, I cannot accept the amendment. 
 I am extremely indebted to the hon. Members for Woking and for Upminster for their keen proof reading. We can accept amendment No. 308. I hope that, because I shall accept that amendment, the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey will consider withdrawing amendment No. 331.

Simon Hughes: The hon. Member for Upminster may chalk up her first success, and I wish her many greater ones as her time in the House continues.
 The Government's willingness to examine the definition of organisations is welcome. I should be grateful if the Minister would examine the point about ''for gain''. I do not have all the previous legislation in front of me, so I do not know whether the definition of ''for gain'' is explained in that, but we should ensure that when tackling profiteers we do not catch other people who might have an indirect gain, a family advantage or a family reunion. 
 I was grateful for the Minister's clarification. We understand each other, and understand that honourably assisting an asylum seeker to come to a port of entry or border to say, ''I'm an asylum seeker'' is different from a person who is smuggled into the country. 
 We may need to examine the subsidiary issue—my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Hallam (Mr. Allan) and I shall do further work on it—of whether there is a failure in the previous listed offence because it does not cover this eventuality by an exemption. By definition, there might have had to be a border crossing outside the United Kingdom in order for a person to get here, and technically an offence might have been committed under the previous section. With that proviso—we will return to it during the Bill's final wrap-up—I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Amendment made: No. 308, in page 56, line 42, leave out '(7)' and insert '(6)'.—[Angela Watkinson.]
 Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

Humfrey Malins: I begin by warmly congratulating my hon. Friend the Member for Upminster on her notable success. Hers is the only Opposition amendment that has been accepted, which shows the force of her argument.
 The clause breaks new ground, and we must examine it carefully. I summarise my thoughts by saying this: the Government are not on top of the issue. They have not answered points satisfactorily, and they should take the clause away, re-examine it and perhaps deal with these matters in an extradition Bill. 
 We must be clear what the clause says. In simple terms, it says that a person in this country can and will be tried in this country for aiding and abetting an activity that is an offence not in this country but in another country. It goes on to say that that person will be tried under rules of evidence that may differ entirely from the rules of evidence in the country where the activity is an offence. Furthermore, he may receive a sentence that would be unlawful in the country where the activity is an offence. He may offend if he does something that he believes, wrongly, to be an offence in the country concerned. That is nonsense, as is the fact that he will be tried in this country by courts that are unqualified to deal with issues that may affect the activity that is the crime in the other country. 
 When asked where the cases will be tried and what the expertise level will be, the Minister answered, disappointingly, that she believed that people would not be tried in magistrates courts because of the important powers of sentence. In that case, why is the offence not indictable only? Why can it be tried in the magistrates courts with a maximum penalty of six months? As the Bill stands, a case can be tried in a rural magistrates court. Complicated issues such as extradition have previously been limited to specialist courts and specialist stipendiary magistrates and district judges. There are only four in London who are qualified to deal with such cases. Those of us who sit part-time on the judiciary are not qualified to deal with such matters. 
 There is nothing in the Bill to stop cases being tried—yes, tried, not only committed for trial—in any magistrates court in this country. The Minister may say that there is nothing to stop any such case going to a Crown court. One would have thought that the judiciary, magistrates and clerks would be aware of that and would have received expert training. There has not been any such expert training, and none is proposed. 
 For the reasons that I have given, I do not think that the Government have thought through the clause. They must think about it much more. We shall not vote against it, because I am sure that the Government will recognise that there are real problems of principle as well as detail. I hope that they will take on board those issues and consider whether the matters should more properly be placed in an extradition Bill. On Report or Third Reading, or perhaps in the other place, I hope that they will clarify the situation and make it much more satisfactory.

Simon Hughes: I follow the hon. Gentleman by making similar noises of concern about the clause, which introduces three new offences and provides for forfeiture of vehicle, ship or aircraft in the event of any of those offences being committed. We have most difficulty with the first new offence of assisting unlawful immigration. I do not pretend to be an expert in that part of European Union law, but I understand that the offence has been proposed because of the EU directive on mutual recognition of expulsion decisions, on which we are obliged to legislate by the end of 2002. If that is the case, it is entirely proper. However, the offence should be included in an extradition Bill, where we will consider cross-border arrangements for law enforcement and the EU arrest warrant, or in a stand-alone piece of legislation that would have proper parliamentary scrutiny.
 We may be in the process of creating Europewide offences, but this is difficult territory. I have not read the full record, but Lord Rooker answered questions about the EU arrest warrant in a debate in the House of Lords yesterday. There is concern across the political spectrum in both Houses about such offences. Whether people are pro-EU or anti-EU, they are concerned that there are common standards, principles, evidence and processes, as well as common tariffs, to which the hon. Gentleman referred. Like him, my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Hallam and I do not propose to vote against the clause, which contains reasonable provisions. 
 I have questions on the proposals. Am I right in thinking that they set a precedent? Have any other countries in the EU legislated for this, or are we the first? If they have, have there been charges elsewhere in the EU under what I presume is comparable legislation? Have the judiciary—magistrates, district and Crown court judges—been consulted, and have they responded? I would be surprised if they had happily signed up to the legislation, saying that it was uncomplicated and that they were fine about it. Something is wrong with the process if they have not been consulted. All those who are expected to implement the legislation should be consulted. The Bill should not include this legislation. There is a general view that the Government have tacked the provisions into this Bill, perhaps for understandable reasons, when they should be in a general criminal justice or other Bill. Time should be spent getting it right.

Rosie Winterton: On other legislation, section 71 of the Criminal Justice Act 1993 deals with EC taxation offences and has similar certificate provisions. I have listened carefully to everything that hon. Gentlemen have said, but it is important to emphasise that we are trying to enable the UK to participate in a joint approach to combat such crime on a European, not simply a national, level. We are asked over and over again to ensure that we are working with other European member states on this issue, and the legislation is part of that. If we are not able to tackle the issue on a Europewide basis, we will fail in our duty and not respond to public opinion on the matter.

Humfrey Malins: In what specific way is the measure we are discussing better than extradition?

Rosie Winterton: To start with, it will enable us to achieve reciprocal arrangements with other member states and will pave the way for the UK to comply with the European directive and framework decision on the facilitation of unauthorised entry, movement and residence, which has yet to be formally adopted. If the hon. Gentleman thinks that extradition works brilliantly in tackling the issue, I accept that that is his opinion, but we feel that further measures need to be considered.
 I have listened carefully to the points made by Opposition Members but we hope that they will support the clause, because it is an important part of tackling the issue on a much wider basis, as we are asked repeatedly to do. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 112, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 113 - traffic in prostitution

Neil Gerrard: I beg to move amendment No. 259, in page 58, line 42, leave out from 'if' to 'in' in line 43 and insert
'he uses force, coercion, or deception, or abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability'.
 The purpose of the amendment is to clarify the effects of the clause and ensure that it is effective. Anyone who has looked at trafficking in prostitution, not only in the UK but across the European Union, knows that it has grown on an alarming scale over the past few years. North London university carried out research on the issue for the Home Office a couple of years ago. A report by an NGO last year suggested that several hundred women and children are trafficked for prostitution every year in the UK alone. 
 In December last year, hon. Members were shown some disturbing examples of trafficking in prostitution, particularly near ports. In West Sussex, for example, social services have over the past few years identified 66 children—nearly all girls—who had been brought into the country and claimed asylum as unaccompanied minors. They had disappeared shortly after being taken into care by social services because of that claim. Traffickers had made contact with them. It is suspected in most cases that they were no longer in the UK but in other European countries, several almost certainly in Italy. Many west African women who end up in prostitution are brought through the UK to Italy. Quite a lot of the examples of the cases discovered in the UK involve women and children from eastern Europe. It is a nasty, and lucrative, business. 
 Everyone to whom I have spoken about the issue welcomes the fact that the Government are starting to do something about it. The provisions in the clause are interim ones, because many of the measures necessary 
 to deal with the problem would come under criminal justice rather than immigration and nationality legislation. When, in the not too distant future, we debate a new criminal justice Bill, I hope that this will be an important element of it. 
 The wording of the clause puzzles me. The UK is already signed up to the wording in the UN protocol for dealing with the trafficking of women and children. Some of the same words—''force'', ''coercion'', ''deception'', ''abuse of power'' and ''position of vulnerability''—are used in my amendment, and indeed in the EU framework decision on combating trafficking, which is due for formal adoption at a Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting within the next few weeks. 
 At the beginning of May, the Home Office wrote to Anti-Slavery International, pointing out that signing the UN protocol and negotiating the EU framework decision showed that the Government were committed to introducing legislation. In response to questions raised by Anti-Slavery International, the Home Office stated: 
 ''Like you it is keen to ensure that the same definition of trafficking is used domestically and internationally.'' 
I therefore found it surprising when I saw the definition in the clause, which is not exactly the same. It could be argued that the effects will be the same, but that is to be established. The EU definition pinpoints the methods used: force, deception and preying on vulnerable people. 
 The amendment would also remove the phrase ''for purposes of gain''. The intention is to make it easier to prosecute: it would still be necessary to prove coercion and deception, but not additionally to demonstrate that the person had directly benefited financially. 
 I welcome the clause generally and tabled the amendment to satisfy myself that the clause will achieve what we want it to and that it fits in with the other definitions to which we are signing up in the UN protocol and EU framework decision. As I said, I remain puzzled about the different wording. I also want to ensure that people are prosecuted and to make it easier to progress the prosecutions.

Angela Eagle: The Committee owes you a collective apology, Mr. Illsley. I understand that you dashed from another engagement to chair the last two hours of the sitting on Tuesday, only to discover that we had completed the business ahead of time and nobody had thought to tell you. We all owe you a collective apology for that wasted journey. We are glad to see you in the Chair again. [Hon Members: Hear, hear.]
 My hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow is right to emphasise how seriously the Government take the issue of trafficking for prostitution. He is also right to remind the Committee what a vile but lucrative trade it can be. It is exploitative, and evidence points to the existence of trafficking routes from west Africa through the UK to Italy that may involve women and children. The police, working with immigration officials, have been able to disrupt those routes to some extent.
 My hon. Friend is also right to want to make it easier to prosecute and I am pleased that he welcomed the clause. It is indeed an interim measure. The Bill has limited scope, so we cannot introduce a comprehensive measure against facilitating prostitution, trafficking for prostitution or labour exploitation. This is as wide as we can make the stop-gap protections by introducing this offence, which carries a maximum penalty of 14 years' imprisonment. 
 We want to demonstrate first that we are determined to crack down on the growth of this evil trade, but secondly that we believe that it is worth starting to do so now. We can finish the job by having a much more comprehensive and wide-ranging offence that will be in either the sexual offences reform legislation, which we hope to introduce in due course, or the criminal justice legislation. Both offer us opportunities to put a more comprehensive offence on the statute book. That sends a clear message to those who arrange and profit from this activity that they are engaged in a serious evil and face severe consequences. 
 My hon. Friend is also right to work towards making this offence easier to prosecute. The victims often do not feel much like giving evidence. They are extremely vulnerable and frightened. Often they have been exploited so badly that they find it almost impossible to approach the authorities in a way that enables them to appear before a court so that we can get the perpetrators and put them where they belong, which is behind bars. Unfortunately, my hon. Friend's wording would make it harder to prosecute traffickers. The words 
''force, coercion, or deception, or abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability'', 
introduce additional evidential requirements. The words 
''control, direction or influence over the prostitute's movements in a way which shows that he is aiding, abetting or compelling the prostitution'' 
are more general and require a lower level of coercive behaviour to be proved. 
 We have looked at this carefully and we think that the words in the clause make it easier for us to prove the offence than those in the UN protocol. The other advantage of using those words is that they are well known from existing law on sexual offences and courts are used to dealing with them. They are not a completely new formulation and are therefore more likely to be understood and successful before the courts. I hope that my hon. Friend will realise that we are very sympathetic to his amendment, but we think our original wording is more effective for the purposes that we all share.

Simon Hughes: I am conscious that we want to finish this debate by 6 o'clock. I understand the Minister's argument. I remember from the distant past when I was a lawyer that the courts deal with these cases all the time. They are all too frequent in urban areas. There is a strong argument for seeking to have consistent legislative wording. The hon. Gentleman's words pick up both the UN words, which are universal, and the words that will be in the directive that has been agreed politically and is about to be agreed formally next
 month. If we are to have a consistent Europewide approach, to pick up the Parliamentary Secretary's point in the earlier debate, we should ensure that we follow those words. The words in the clause may not be the right ones and might go too wide and pull people in unintentionally.

Richard Allan: The wording in the amendment includes elements such as coercion. As the Minister rightly said, there would have to be proof that that existed. I wondered whether that was not perhaps an important part of not criminalising individuals whose behaviour, however much one may disagree with it, should not be criminalised. Two individuals might be engaged in an enterprise in which one of them acts as a prostitute in another state where that is entirely legal. In some American states, people work together as a business partnership. One can have views about the morality of that, but the present drafting of the Bill would unjustly render that individual subject to criminal prosecution.
 If there is no coercion, the arrangement is entirely voluntary and the prostitution is taking place in a state where it is legal, should that be rendered illegal? I understand the drive to make illegal the coercive behaviour, but whether uncoerced behaviour should be rendered illegal would not be a problem under the wording in the amendment, but it may be a problem under the existing wording.

Angela Eagle: That is not an offence under immigration legislation, so to fall foul of the law, the hon. Gentleman's little arrangement in the US would have to be importing people into Britain.
 This is a stopgap power, in advance of the much wider rewriting of the law on sexual offences and the arrangements that we expect to see in the forthcoming criminal justice legislation. The power is taken in this Bill, so that we can begin to deal with some of the current problems. I hope that hon. Members realise that we are committed to implementing the European Union framework decision, and that we will be looking to the wording in future Bills. For now we think that it is important to have an offence on the statute book that is understood by the courts, albeit that it is a stopgap measure.

Neil Gerrard: I appreciate the Minister's point that this is a stopgap measure, and that we need an offence on the statute book. I hope, however, that when the negotiation is finished on the EU framework and we are considering future legislation, we will ensure that the wording is consistent. If we are trying to deal with this problem across the EU, as we should, it is pointless to negotiate wording and definitions at EU level and then not to use them.
 I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Sitting suspended for a Division in the House.
 On resuming—

Simon Hughes: I beg to move amendment No. 333, in page 59, line 4, at end insert—
 '(6) A person who has been the subject of trafficking in prostitution shall be eligible to apply for exceptional or indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom.'.
 This probing amendment deals with the other side of the prostitution debate—the victims. I am referring to the people who come or are brought here, who are subject to coercion and who may then be abandoned and left in a vulnerable position. The amendment is designed to discover the Government's view on whether people who have been victimised and horribly traumatised by being dragged across Europe or the world and then left will be allowed to apply for exceptional or indefinite leave to remain, on the basis that this may be the only place where some of them are safe. 
 Over the years, I have met African women at my surgeries who would find it culturally impossible to return to their original community. It is known that they were taken away for the purpose of prostitution. They may or may not have been married. In no circumstances can they contemplate returning to their community. I have met some women who were in an extremely desperate mental and emotional state, because they feared that they would be sent back to communities in which, for religious and cultural reasons, they would not survive. I put it as bluntly as that. 
 The amendment is designed to discover the Government's policy. If we can rescue people, as we hope to, from the grip of those who exploit them, and they have family here or another network of support, it as our obligation to work through with them the best way to proceed and, if necessary and possible, give them the opportunity to stay here. I do not pretend that the amendment's wording is perfect; it is merely an attempt to raise the plight of the victims of a trade that we are all keen to address. I hope that the Minister is sympathetic to the idea behind the amendment.

Neil Gerrard: The amendment ties in with the question of how we encourage victims to give evidence. There has been a tendency, particularly in police raids in London in which women have been swept up from flats in Soho, for all those arrested to be deported. If that is the only consequence of giving evidence, it will inevitably be that much more difficult to encourage some victims to do so. Such evidence is sometimes critical in obtaining the conviction of those responsible. It may be asking too much for the Government to give a blanket agreement on such cases, because a wide variety of circumstances will arise, but I hope that they are prepared to consider victims' circumstances so that such people are not automatically threatened with deportation.

Angela Eagle: I hope that I can reassure the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey that his amendment is unnecessary, because there is nothing to prevent victims who have been trafficked
 from seeking leave to remain. A procedure exists for victims of trafficking to be granted leave on a discretionary basis in appropriate cases that fall outside the categories and the immigration laws. We prefer to keep it that way, simply because we do not wish to create specific statutory protection for those who are trafficked, which might perversely lead to more people being trafficked in order to qualify for leave to remain. We consider sympathetically, case by case, whether someone has been a victim of that appalling trade. Such people may wish to give evidence or be unable to return home, for the reasons given by the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey from his constituency casework. We have the appropriate leeway to grant different forms of protection to enable victims to stay.
 We are also working with other organisations to develop a best practice guide on trafficking for immigration officers, police and others who deal with perpetrators and victims of trafficking, so that they can treat victims more appropriately. We need to understand that the offence is not smuggling but trafficking for sexual exploitation, and that vulnerable, frightened and abused victims must be dealt with accordingly. I hope that with those assurances the hon. Gentleman will withdraw his amendment.

Simon Hughes: I am grateful to the Minister for that explanation, and to the hon. Member for Walthamstow for his contribution. I was not seeking to create a special category, and I agree that making one could have the perverse consequence of more victims being trafficked. I am grateful that the Government will continue to consider cases compassionately according to the individual circumstances. I hope that between we can us convey to victims, who have committed a criminal offence if they are prostitutes, that they may be exempt from prosecution if they come forward, and may be given personal support and possibly citizenship, nationality, entitlement to stay or protection, depending on their circumstances.
 I am encouraged by the Government's position. All hon. Members want to work to overcome the problem and to assist victims as much as possible. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Simon Hughes: Given that the Minister said that the measure was temporary, I hope that it may be included in the sexual offences legislation, which is in the pipeline. That is the right place for it.

Angela Eagle: The hon. Gentleman is not wide of the mark.
 Question put and agreed to.
 Clause 113 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 114 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 115 - employment

Rosie Winterton: I beg to move amendment No. 339, in page 60, leave out lines 14 to 16.

Alan Hurst: With this it will be convenient to take new clause 18—Arrest by immigration officer.

Rosie Winterton: At present, the employment offence in section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration Act 1996 does not carry the power of arrest. To date, the only way in which it has been possible to make arrests has been to use the powers in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. However, those powers apply only to police constables, not to immigration officers. We therefore decided to add a separate power of arrest for the section 8 offence. Subsection (4) introduces a power of arrest without warrant for the employment offence.
 On reflection, however, we decided that introducing a power of arrest without warrant was disproportionate to the offence, which is a summary offence with a maximum penalty of a £5,000 fine. Introducing such a power would not meet our policy objectives of improving business compliance or our ability to enforce the law rather than impose unreasonable penalties. We also want to ensure that employers are protected by incorporating the safeguard of judicial scrutiny prior to arrest. 
 The amendments remove the subsection that gives the power of arrest without warrant for the section 8 offence, and substitute a new clause that provides for an immigration officer to apply for, and a justice of the peace to grant, a warrant to arrest a person reasonably suspected of committing the offence. We do not envisage that the power will often be used. In most cases, we will be aware of the identity and whereabouts of the employer, and it will be possible to take action in relation to the section 8 offence without the need to make an arrest. However, it is important that the power exists for the rare cases in which the employer is likely to go to ground. 
 The clause also remedies an anomaly in relation to offences under section 24(1)(d) of the Immigration Act 1971 and the failure to comply with a requirement to attend or submit to a medical examination. There is a power under section 28B of the 
 Act to enter premises under a warrant in order to search for and arrest someone who is liable to be arrested for that offence. However, there is currently no free-standing power of arrest. 
 I hope that hon. Members will accept the amendment. 
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Clause 115, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Column Number: 351

Clause 116Registration Card

Registration Card

Angela Watkinson: I beg to move amendment No. 310, in page 60, line 30, after 'makes', insert
'or is concerned in the making of'.
 This is a mildly probing amendment to define the meaning of the word ''makes'' more clearly. One or more persons could be involved in the making of false registration cards. Will the Minister expand on the meaning of the word ''makes'' and explain what degree of involvement is envisaged? For example, would it be a defence for someone to say that they only drove the delivery van or went out to buy materials? Several people could be collectively responsible for the whole enterprise, playing varying roles in it. That is more likely than one individual or sole trader being responsible. How safe will the cards be, and how difficult will it be to counterfeit them? As I said, it is only a probing amendment, but clarification of the meaning of ''make'' and the degree of involvement would be most helpful.

Angela Eagle: The application registration card—or ARC—is issued to asylum seekers and their dependants as an acknowledgement of their application for asylum. The card contains information about the individual asylum seeker, including name, address, nationality, date of birth, photograph and fingerprints, which are digitalised and stored on a computer chip. It contains biometric information that can be read and matched with information recorded about individuals. It therefore establishes identity in a way that is extremely difficult to forge.
 Even if it were possible to forge an application registration card that looked the same, our record would not contain the information on fingerprints and individual identities necessary to match it. It is a highly sophisticated system. I hesitate to say that it is foolproof, but the card is far more difficult to forge or counterfeit than the standard acknowledgment letter, which it replaced and which could be photocopied effectively and was subject to widespread fraud. We hope that all asylum seekers will have been issued with these cards by September. We may extend the card to non-asylum seekers for immigration purposes when we do not know an individual's identity and are seeking to establish it. 
 I am happy to tell the hon. Lady that her amendment is unnecessary. Under section 8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861—it may not have been at the forefront of the hon. Lady's mind when she tabled the amendment, though I am surprised that it was not at the forefront of the hon. Member for Woking's mind—anyone who aids, abets, counsels or procures the commission of any indictable offence is liable to be tried, indicted and punished as a principal offender. That covers the issues that the hon. Lady raised.

Angela Watkinson: I take some comfort from the Minister's comments. How to make it as difficult as possible to counterfeit has been carefully considered. I am unfamiliar with the tests that will be used when the cards are presented, but—

Angela Eagle: There will be a matching of the fingerprint data on the card with the record that we hold. That and the photograph on the card will confirm who the person is.

Angela Watkinson: I thank the Minister and I have confidence in the system that is being introduced. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Simon Hughes: I beg to move amendment No. 334, in page 61, line 19, leave out subsection (7).
 This simple amendment would delete new section 26A(7) of the 1971 Act, which deals with registration cards. The Minister will have expected the point that I want to make. 
 Obviously, the power will allow the Secretary of State to amend by secondary legislation the definition of ''registration card'' in new section 26A(1), and to make consequential amendments. We all welcome the registration card as a substitute for the voucher system and a new way to ensure that people are within the system. I understand that some of the details will change as technology develops, as might the processing of the details on to the card. Several sources have confirmed that, in their view, proposed new section 26A(7) will permit unlimited variation in the definition of ''registration card''. It could therefore be turned into something significantly different from what the Minister described. 
 I do not doubt that the Government do not have such a proposal in mind at the moment. The Minister was right to say that the present system was hopeless, as it involves many pieces of paper that appear to have no great statutory or constitutional validity, can be photocopied and do not look as though they are of much importance. It is not a satisfactory system, and I am sure that we have all had constituency experience of it. 
 The amendment is probing, and is designed to see how we can ensure that the registration card is used only for the purpose currently envisaged, which is by applicants from the moment of application until the determination of their asylum case and the resolution of that application. We do not want registration cards to be more widely used. 
 Discussion on the subject started in the wider context of the perfectly proper debate on identity cards. Obviously, some of those willing to sign up to a registration card, as I am, may, like me, not want to sign up to an identity card, which deals with much wider issues. Some of us want safeguards, so that the Government do not move by stealth from the registration card to something else without appropriate authority.

Angela Eagle: The wider debate about identity cards will be facilitated by the consultation document due to be issued before the start of the summer. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will contribute to it in his usual way. I confirm that it is not our intention to turn the applicant registration card into an identity card for everyone by stealth.
 The amendment would remove a provision that would allow us by order to extend the use of the card from asylum seekers to other categories of immigration customer, if I can use that phrase. For example, we might give an applicant registration card, after some future evolution of it, to a person who on arrival in the United Kingdom failed to provide a valid passport with a photograph or other document to establish their identity. If we did so, it would be because we wanted them to be able to prove their identity while the work was done, if they were on temporary admission. We might give someone who arrived in the UK with a counterfeit or fraudulently obtained document such a card in future, so that they could establish their identity while that was sorted out. 
 The amendment would mean that if there were to be such extensions of the use of the card and someone were to counterfeit a card in an extended category, we could not prosecute them for doing so, which seems ludicrous. 
 I am sure that the hon. Gentleman tabled the amendment so that we could have a discussion about the intentions with respect to the card. We are currently issuing the card to all asylum seekers. We hope to have that done by September, and it is proceeding well. Asylum seekers will then be able to use the card to establish their nationality at the 500 NASS-enabled post offices. They can use it to establish their identity when they pick up their cash allowances, now that vouchers have been abolished. 
 Several factors make it easier to administer the system by checking on identity in an area where it is often forged. Those advantages could be extended to other immigration situations, and the clause and the order-making power are designed to enable that. However, they are not a backdoor way of introducing ID cards for the 60 million people currently residing in the UK.

Simon Hughes: I am partly reassured by the Minister's remarks. I have one remaining question. The definition of ''registration card'' in new section 26A(1), which is open to change under the provision in subsection (7), is limited by (1)(b), which states that a card is issued
''wholly or partly in connection with a claim for asylum''. 
That could clearly be changed and it could be extended to anybody in an immigration applicant category. I do not understand how, if we allow subsection (7) through, we prevent the card from being used for categories other than those related to immigration. I accept that the measure appears in immigration legislation, but will the Minister tell we how it is limited to immigration purposes? Unless it is limited, the Secretary of State could change the emphasis.

Angela Eagle: It is limited by virtue of this being an immigration Bill.

Simon Hughes: That is not very reassuring.

Angela Eagle: The hon. Gentleman should be reassured. There is no intention to widen the scope of any measure in the Bill so that it has a general application. This Bill is concerned with immigration, nationality and asylum. When it becomes an Act, it will still involve only those issues. If we were to decide to introduce an ID card in the future, there would have to be legislation for that. No doubt the hon. Gentleman would contribute to the debate on that in his usual way. This is not a backdoor way of introducing a generalised ID card. It can--and we hope that it will-be evolved for use as a method of identification in other immigration contexts. That is why the clause has the flexibility to allow the card to evolve in that way without having to pass further primary legislation. However, if we do evolve the card in that way, there will be further parliamentary scrutiny, because of order-making powers.

Simon Hughes: I appreciate that further scrutiny is ensured by the order-making process. I also understand the Minister's assurance, and I accept that the measure is not intended to be a method of facilitating an ID card. I know about the anticipated consultation paper—there are five weeks until the summer recess, so that is the time we have for it. It would be helpful if the Minister and her officials could examine the wording and table an amendment that said something like, ''issued by the Secretary of State wholly or partly in connection with a claim for asylum or in relation to immigration matters,'' so that the measure would be clearly limited.
 I accept that the measure appears in this immigration Bill, but I do not think, although I am not an expert, that that would necessarily limit it. However, I am happy to leave the matter for the time being, and if the Minister will reflect on it, I will too. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Richard Allan: An issue of concern remains about the development of registration powers. The Minister referred to the way in which the contracts are let. I know, having asked questions about the proposal when it was originally made, that the current system for issuing registration cards to asylum seekers, which as the Minister says has already started, has been carried out by the extension of the terms of an existing contract. The Minister just said that there is a possibility of extending registration to other immigration categories. That would imply that the nature of the contract could be extended by orders of magnitude without parliamentary scrutiny, as my hon. Friend indicated through his amendment. There will be concern if we see the growth of a major new system within the immigration and nationality directorate, which we in Parliament have no ability to scrutinise.
 There is concern about the new computerised system in the immigration and nationality directorate, which has received critical attention in the past, and I expect that to continue. If there is a major extension, I hope that we will be able to scrutinise it properly in Parliament.

Angela Eagle: There is an order-making power, so we would have to come back to Parliament and the scrutiny would be there. I hope that the hon. Gentleman recognises the benefits—more protection against fraud, faster access to the information that is needed, which ought to help us in processing, and more control over the systems, which will be a welcome administrative improvement—as well as worrying about what might go wrong, and will welcome a development that has enabled us to have a much more secure system in terms of establishing the identities of asylum seekers, and perhaps in future other immigration customers, if I can call them that.

Richard Allan: My view of parliamentary scrutiny is precisely that it should be to assist the proper functioning of systems such as this. Scrutiny is a positive process, so I hope that the Minister does not come away with the idea that I am suggesting scrutiny simply to do down new systems that have to be introduced.

Angela Eagle: I assure the hon. Gentleman that I relish and enjoy scrutiny, parliamentary and otherwise.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 116 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 117 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 118 - Sections 116 and 117: consequential amendments

Angela Eagle: I beg to move amendment No. 340, in page 62, line 9, at end insert—
'(a) '.

Alan Hurst: With this it will be convenient to take Government amendment No. 341.

Angela Eagle: As drafted, the clause allows a constable or immigration officer to arrest somebody who has committed one of the new offences, possessing and forging immigration stamps. Incredibly, until the Bill reaches the statute book that will not be an offence. That means that, unless it is absolutely certain that the card that somebody is trying to use is false, any arrest would be unlawful. Some of the new offences introduced by clause 116 are an offence only if there is no reasonable excuse. That is also the case with the new offence of possessing an immigration stamp. Ultimately, it will be for a court to decide whether a suspect has a reasonable excuse for possessing a stamp—perhaps it has been found and he is on the way to the police station to hand it in. If that is not the case, an offence will have been committed and the power of
 arrest will apply. If the excuse is reasonable, no offence will have been committed and any arrest will be unlawful.
 I hope that hon. Members will appreciate that the amendments to clause 118 clarify that position and help to create more clarity about the power in clause 117 regarding possessing immigration stamps in order to falsify immigration documents. 
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendment made: No. 341, in page 62, line 10, at end insert— 
', or 
 (b) whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting has committed an offence under section 26A or 26B.'.— [Angela Eagle.]
 Clause 118, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 119 - Power of entry

Humfrey Malins: I beg to move amendment No. 311, in page 62, line 32, after '(c)', insert
'with a warrant issued by a magistrates' court and'.
 This is a probing amendment to decide whether, on occasions such as this, we should have a magistrates court warrant issued as well as the other safeguards. Can the Minister comment?

Angela Eagle: The power of entry by warrant already exists, but the whole point of the clause is to render a warrant unnecessary in the case of business premises. The Government are committed to increasing the number of failed asylum seekers removed each year. We are also committed to cracking down on illegal working. In many cases, those who go to ground after the failure of an asylum claim, or who have perhaps never brought themselves to the attention of the authorities and claimed asylum, are working illegally and using false names and forged or altered documents, making it extremely difficult to trace even when they entered employment.
 Many employers are prepared to co-operate with immigration service personnel when information suggests that an immigration offender may be working on their premises. However, some are not, and increasingly employers who were formerly prepared to assist are taking a similar line. 
 The clause means that the employer will not be able to refuse entry to an immigration officer or constable making an arrest under the new powers. There are already powers in the Immigration Act 1971 that allow a constable or immigration officer to apply to a magistrate for a warrant. The novel effect of the amendment would be that, having satisfied the magistrate that an offender is on the premises, the individual would have to go back for explicit permission to use the warrant. That would make an already difficult process even more difficult. 
 We know that illegal employment occurs. It is often exploitative in nature. The purpose of the clause is to allow immigration officers who suspect a particular, perhaps non-co-operative, employer to go into a 
 premises without a warrant in order to search for immigration offenders. With that explanation, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw the amendment.

Humfrey Malins: Following that explanation, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Amendment made: No. 255, in page 63, line 7, leave out ''arrests'' and insert ''detains''.—[Angela Eagle.] 
 Clause 119, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 120 - Power to search for evidence

Richard Allan: I beg to move amendment No. 335, in page 63, line 40, leave out from ''if'' to end of line 41 and insert
''on application made by an immigration officer a justice of the peace is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing''.

Alan Hurst: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 312, in page 63, line 41, after ''officer'', insert
''is in possession of a warrant to search and''.

Richard Allan: This is another in the family of ''seek a warrant from a justice of the peace'' amendments, in common with the one that we have just debated. We are seeking to tease out the reason why the Government feel that the powers in the first part of the clause should not require prior judicial scrutiny, whereas a JP's warrant is required in the second part of the clause. We suggest that there should be a stage of demonstrating to a JP that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the records need to be recovered from most premises.
 In general, as a matter of principle, we feel much more comfortable when a JP's warrant is required to pick up sensitive information and employee records. We will later debate the scope of the employee records phase, but employee records are sensitive material. I want to hear the Minister's justification of why a JP's warrant should not be required under all circumstances, if one is going in to search for evidence of such a sensitive nature.

Angela Eagle: The clause inserts two new sections into the Immigration Act 1971. Both refer back to earlier clauses. Where an immigration offender has been arrested on business premises, there is an additional power to allow a constable or immigration officer to search the premises for employee records when he believes that an offence has been committed.
 Put simply, given the time of evening that we have reached, if we have to go for more warrants, the likelihood in many cases is that the records for which the search is being made will disappear while the warrant process is being undertaken. The important thing is that records thought to be of substantial value 
 to the investigation of an offence of failing to disclose the required information, or of dishonesty on the part of the asylum seeker, may be seized and retained at a time when we know that they are there, without giving those who are profiting from exploitative labour and illegal work the chance to dispose of the evidence before we get our hands on it.

Richard Allan: We remain concerned about any provisions that allow searching to take place without further oversight, but at this stage I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Richard Allan: I beg to move amendment No. 336, in page 64, line 1, leave out 'employee records' and insert 'records of that employee.'

Alan Hurst: With this it will be convenient to take the following amendments: No. 337, in page 64, line 6, leave out 'employee records' and insert 'records of that employee.'
 No. 338, in page 64, line 14, leave out 'employee records' and insert 'records of that employee.'

Richard Allan: The amendments are designed to refine the scope of the records that could be removed from the premises. In particular, we are aiming to confine the material that may be taken away to the records of the employee who has been arrested for the immigration offences. The rationale behind that is that we feel uncomfortable about a provision that would seem to allow the officers to take away all the employee records from premises where perhaps only one individual has been arrested for an immigration offence. In being fair to others who work there who may have committed no offence whatever, we feel that it would be more appropriate if the wording of the law said that it was the records of that specific employee—the one who had been arrested—that can be taken away rather than the records of all the employees in general.

Angela Eagle: Currently, all the records can be searched, and it is unlikely that a specific immigration offender's records would be separate. If other immigration offenders came to light during a search for an individual's records, would it not be a reasonable idea to allow them to be looked at too? That is not unreasonable when we are looking to crack down on illegal working. It is in the public interest to crack down on illegal working.

Richard Allan: Again, we remain concerned. The Minister has talked about searching through the records, but the word ''retention'' is importantly contained in the clause. The officer would have the power not only to search through the records but to seize and retain them. That is the point at which we become concerned. It may appear easier to an immigration officer to take the lot away and look through them later, but that means a lot of innocent employees will have their records removed from the premises.

Angela Eagle: We cannot seize records if no offence has been committed. If an offence has been committed, records are liable to be seized as evidence.

Richard Allan: I do not want to labour the point, because we have little time. [Hon Members: ''Then don't.''] We will return to the point again, but the Minister has said that the records will not be seized unless an offence has been committed. We accept that an offence will have to have been committed. What we are querying is whether the records belong to the offender. That remains an open question under the existing wording.
 In order to facilitate progress, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 120 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clauses 121 to 126 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 7 - Repeals

Amendment made: No. 397, in page 78, line 11, at end insert— {**t cols="2"**} {**bt**} 
 'Section 31(d).'. 
 —[Angela Eagle.]

Neil Gerrard: I beg to move amendment No. 13, in page 78, leave out lines 29 and 30 and insert 'Sections 26 to 29'.

Alan Hurst: With this it will be convenient to take the following: New Clause 2—British Citizenship—
 'Any person who was a British Overseas citizen under the British Nationality Act 1981 or the Hong Kong Act 1985 or a British subject, or a British Protected Person, immediately before commencement of this Act, and who holds no other citizenship, shall at commencement of this Act become a British citizen.'.

Neil Gerrard: I see that I have a huge amount of time to deal with what I think is actually quite an important subject, so I want to make two or three brief but important points. The question of British overseas citizens was referred to on Second Reading by my hon.
 Friends the Member for Slough (Fiona Mactaggart) and for Leicester, South (Mr. Marshall). The Home Secretary said in response that he recognised that there was an issue that needed to be dealt with. He said that it was a moral obligation, and that we should look for some alternative arrangement to the existing special quota scheme. The new clause is one possible way of fulfilling that obligation. I appreciate that there may be other mechanisms that we could consider.
 The Government have said that circumstances have changed. The special quota scheme was set up because of pressures in countries of origin that do not apply any more. It is true that the numbers are now quite small. I would remind the Committee that we created the situation by what we did in the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 and the British Nationality Act 1981. We have a moral obligation to deal with what is now a dwindling number of people who are effectively stateless.

Angela Eagle: The Home Secretary's words on Second Reading speak for themselves. I assure my hon. Friend that we are considering how we can act on that. There are ways other than new clause 2 and amendment No. 13, and I hope that he recognises that. We will deal with the matter in due course.

Neil Gerrard: With that reassurance, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Amendment made: No. 398, in page 78, line 52, at end insert— {**t cols="2"**} {**bt**} 
 'Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 (c. 68) 
 Section 2A. 
 Section 7A(6). 
 Schedule 2.'. 
 _[Angela Eagle.] 
 Schedule 7, as amended, agreed to. 
 Clauses 127 to 129 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
Further consideration adjourned.—[Mrs. McGuire.] 
 Adjourned accordingly at Seven o'clock till Tuesday 21 May at half-past Ten o'clock.